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Abstract 
The rapid development in healthcare technologies in recent years has resulted in the 
need for health services, whether publicly funded or insurance-based, to identify 
means to maximise the benefits and provide equitable distribution of limited 
resources.  This has resulted in the need for rationing decisions, and there has been 
considerable debate regarding the substantive and procedural ethical principles that 
promote distributive justice when making such decisions.  In this paper I argue that, 
whilst the scientifically rigorous approaches of evidence-based healthcare are claimed 
as aspects of procedural justice that legitimize such guidance, there are biases and 
distortions in all aspects of the process that may lead to epistemic injustices.  
Regardless of adherence to principles of distributive justice in the decision-making 
process, evidential failings may undermine the fairness and legitimacy of such 
decisions.  In particular, I identify epistemic exclusion that denies certain patient and 
professional groups the opportunity to contribute to the epistemic endeavour.  This 
occurs at all stages of the process, from the generation, analysis and reporting of the 
underlying evidence, through the interpretation of such evidence, to the decision 
making that determines access to healthcare resources.  I further argue that this is 
compounded by processes which confer unwarranted epistemic privilege on experts in 
relation to explicit or implicit value judgements, which are not within their remit.  I 
suggest a number of areas in which changes to the processes for developing, 
regulating, reporting and evaluating evidence may improve the legitimacy of such 
processes.  
 
  
Background 
Healthcare technology has developed rapidly in recent years, with escalating costs for 
new drugs and other diagnostic or therapeutic technologies.  Demand for potentially 
beneficial healthcare has outstripped the supply, resulting in the need to ration limited 
resources.  Where this occurs through informal mechanisms that restrict access to 
certain services, there may be overt distributive injustices due to differential access on 
the basis of socio-economic, geographic or demographic factors.  However, where 
government bodies, healthcare providers or other agencies, develop evidence-based 
guidelines or policy, part of their role may be seen as ensuring that any rationing 
decisions are made on a just basis. 
The requirements of distributive justice may be met by adherence to underlying 
substantive principles based, for example, on fair equality of opportunity,[1] 
maximising cost benefit,[2] or a capability approach.[3]  Such principles may be in 
conflict, or may result in indeterminacy, and adherence to the principles of procedural 
justice has been suggested as an alternative or additional requirement.  Commonly, 
the implementation of procedural justice refers to the four principles of accountability 
for reasonableness (AFR); transparency of the process, relevance of the decision 
criteria, potential for challenge and revision, and a regulatory framework.[4]   
Substantive principles and procedural justice are not mutually exclusive but overlap, 
with claims of relevance usually involving reference to substantive principles.[5] 
Whatever substantive or procedural principles are applied, the fairness and legitimacy 
of evidence-based guidance and policy rely on the accuracy and validity of the 
XQGHUO\LQJHYLGHQFH,QWKLVSDSHU,DUJXHWKDWµHYLGHQFH¶DVLWLVXQGHUVWRRGDQG
used in such processes, is not restricted to research-based knowledge that provides the 
best estimates of the benefits, risks and costs of treatment.  Rather, it includes implicit 
or explicit value judgements, which are not necessarily in the domain of the expert 
advisory committees or other bodies that make such decisions.  I highlight some of 
the systematic biases, distortions and epistemic injustices that are inherent in such 
evidence, and argue that evidential failings may undermine the claims to the 
legitimacy and fairness of the decision-making process.   
Epistemic injustice and evidence 
Fricker suggests that µWKHUHLVDGLVWLQFWLYHO\HSLVWHPLFJHQXVRILQMXVWLFHLQZKLFK
VRPHRQHLVZURQJHGVSHFLILFDOO\LQWKHLUFDSDFLW\DVDNQRZHU¶.[6]  Testimonial 
injustice has been described in healthcare where a patient may have unique 
knowledge of their experience of an illness or treatment, which is not given 
appropriate credibility.[7]   
However, the potential to contribute to shared knowledge does not always take the 
form of conscious awareness in those who provide WKHLQIRUPDWLRQ:HPD\µNQRZ¶
that we have a feeling of nausea but be unaware of a fall in our haemoglobin level, 
without realising that both of these may have potential to add to the shared pool of 
knowledge about an illness or healthcare intervention.  If we belong to a marginalised 
group that is excluded from a research study, then that exclusion may unjustly 
disadvantage ourselves and the group to which we belong, by distorting the results of 
such a study.   
Epistemic contributions may occur on many different levels.  We may take on the role 
of informant, providing knowledge of our experience of a condition, treatment or 
outcome, offering potential benefits to ourselves or others facing similar situations.  
To deny us credibility in this context seems to be a clear example of testimonial 
injustice.  However, other situations are less clear cut, we may contribute to the 
generation of shared knowledge, without holding that knowledge ourselves.  In some 
circumstances, we may offer ourselves as an object of research, allowing our blood 
SDUDPHWHUVWREHPHDVXUHG6XFKµREMHFWLILFDWLRQ¶PD\QRWEHQHJDWLYH; to deny us the 
opportunity to contribute to shared knowledge in this way may be considered an 
injustice. 
7KHWHUPµHYLGHQFH-EDVHG¶FDUULHVZLWKLWDQDLU of scientific authority, suggesting 
decisions that follow from a rigorous evaluation of what is known.  However, 
examination of the evidence used in such decisions reveals that it includes 
information relating to values, expert judgements and alternative scenarios, the merits 
of which need to be considered by the decision-making body.  Apart from those value 
judgements that inform the specific decision, the framework within which the 
decision is made embodies many assumptions, such as those about methodology and 
perspective.   
Where value judgements are required for evidence-based decision making we are 
faced with a choice between using the values of different constituencies; empowered 
authorities, µH[SHUW¶ advisors, patients, regional or national societal samples.  The 
evidence required may include studies to quantify these values or develop consensus 
of opinion amongst these various groups, in order to justify a specific stance in 
relation to them.  Many research methods that contribute to the evidence do not elicit 
what might conventionally be VHHQDVµIDFWXDO¶NQRZOHGJHEXWLQFOXGHSUHIHUHQFH-
based studies, qualitative interviews or focus groups to elicit value judgements, or 
methods such as Delphi techniques to reach consensus amongst experts.  This 
presentation of values and opinion in the form of scientific evidence can blur the 
boundary between those aspects of the evidence that relate to knowledge and those 
concerned with value judgements.  It may, therefore, be more useful to think in terms 
of evidential injustices, rather than purely epistemic ones. 
In a decision-making context, there is potential for injustices to occur through the way 
in which evidence is generated and reported, or how it is interpreted and used in the 
decision-making process.  In the following sections I explore the ways in which 
potential injustices may arise in each of the areas.  I then go on to consider who is 
wronged by these evidential injustices and the steps that may be taken to try and 
ameliorate them.  
 
Injustices in the generation of evidence 
Extensive methodological development in recent years has focussed on the evaluation 
of research evidence, with hierarchies of evidence and quality assessment frameworks 
that commonly place the systematic synthesis of the results from randomised 
controlled trials (RCT) as the pinnacle of evidence, regarding the outcomes of 
interventions. However, whatever research methodology is used, there remains a 
potential for biases to occur.  The Centre for Evidence Based Practice in Oxford has 
FUHDWHGD³FDWDORJXHRIELDV´ZKLFKFXUUHQWO\OLVWVLQGHWDLOW\SHVRIELDVDQG
reports about 250 potential candidates for the catalogue (see 
https://catalogofbias.org/).  In what follows, I focus on those biases that seem most 
likely to undermine distributive justice.   
Potential injustices begin with the choice of subject areas for research.  The decisions 
about which conditions, interventions and outcomes will be the subject of research are 
made by those who fund or commission the research and may thus serve the 
commercial or political ends of those with economic or political power.  In the UK 
and elsewhere, about two thirds of research funding is from the global pharmaceutical 
industry,[8] largely aimed at the development of drugs and devices in particularly 
profitable sectors that have the potential for exclusivity through protected intellectual 
property.[9]  Even government and charity funded research suffers from biases in the 
selection of topics, with funding distribution matching poorly to the sectors where 
there is most clinical need.[10]   
The mismatch between patient need and research investment may partly reflect these 
commercial and political influences, but the growth of evidence-based practice has 
also altered the emphasis of research.  RCTs may privilege certain conditions, 
treatments and outcomes that are more suitable for RCTs, whereas complex 
interventions, caring processes or person-centred approaches are less amenable to 
such research.  Expert evidence of healthcare practitioners is seen as being at the 
lower end of the evidence hierarchy, so professionals working in certain disciplines 
may suffer a credibility deficit.  Such disciplines include those where there is a less 
established tradition of positivist scientific research and greater dependence upon 
interpersonal and qualitative aspects of healthcare. 
This can become a self-perpetuating situation, with the research methodology 
becoming the de facto measure, not only of the scientific rigour of the research, but of 
the status of the researcher, leading to editorial boards, priority-setting committees 
and research commissioning boards being largely filled by academics who have a 
vested interest in such research.  
The focus on RCTs leads to the potential for certain groups to be systematically 
excluded from the collection of evidence.  This may result from the explicit exclusion 
criteria used in many clinical trials.  Van Spall et al[11] show that many studies 
excluded the elderly, women, children or those with other diseases, without 
justification, and Cherubini et al highlight the biases caused by excluding older people 
from studies of heart failure.[12]   
Some of the forms of epistemic exclusion may be less explicit.  For example, methods 
used for establishing outcomes are often based upon questionnaires that may only be 
accessible to those who are literate in a particular language.[13]  There may also be 
indirect forms of exclusion, such as those based upon geography.  On a national scale, 
large research studies tend to take place preferentially in areas associated with leading 
teaching hospitals, where practices, patient demographics, equipment and staffing 
may not match that available in other areas.[14]  For international trials, recruitment 
may be driven by the costs and regulatory arrangements in different jurisdictions and 
there is evidence that this has led to questionable practices in clinical trials.[15]  
Other aspects of trial design may also lead to distortions.  The comparator may be 
selected to maximise the expected benefit, trials may be placebo-controlled or use a 
comparator that is not considered the best available in routine practice.  Such 
comparator bias is likely to result in the exaggeration of any potential benefits of the 
new intervention.[16] 
The selection of outcomes may also lead to biases.  Important outcomes may be rare 
or delayed, in which case it may be impractical for studies to be large enough, or 
sufficiently prolonged, to accurately estimate their occurrence and sponsors are keen 
to minimise the cost, size and duration of clinical trials.  This may lead to the use of 
composite outcomes, where several different events may be counted together, as in 
the use of major adverse cardiac events (MACE) in cardiovascular trials.[17]  Another 
FRPPRQDGDSWDWLRQLVWKHXVHRIµVXUURJDWH¶RXWFRPHV; where an outcome of interest 
is difficult to measure, due to the timescale or other factors, an alternative that is more 
µREMHFWLYH¶LPPHGLDWHRUHasy to measure may be found.  For example, important 
clinical outcomes in cancer treatments may be the length and quality of survival, but 
these are difficult to measure and confounded by complex treatment pathways and the 
need for prolonged follow-up, so that measures such as progression free survival, time 
to progression or tumour response rates are often used as surrogates.[18]  
Further biases occur in the reporting of trial outcomes.  It is estimated that about half 
of trials that take place never result in published or publicly available data[19] and 
there is evidence of distortion or selective reporting in those that are published.[20, 
21]  This is compounded by editorial policies that make it more likely that positive 
results will be published and widely cited, leading to publication bias.[22]  
Many studies are halted or abandoned and data from these may not be available, 
creating further distortions.[23]  In 2013 the RIAT (restoring invisible and abandoned 
trials) initiative promoted the reanalysis of data from such trials and demonstrated 
examples of trials where reanalysis challenged the original conclusions.[24]  One 
IDPRXVH[DPSOHRIVXFKGLVWRUWLRQVLVWKHKLVWRU\RIµ6WXG\¶DWULDORISDUR[HWLQH
which was reported as showing this to be an effective and well tolerated treatment for 
depression.  Subsequent investigation showed that GSK had failed to report safety 
data and in 2012 the US Department of Justice settled criminal and civil proceedings 
with a record $3bn fine for GSK, although it was estimated that they had made $30bn 
profit through the illegal promotion.[25]  In 2012 the British Medical Journal devoted 
an entire issue to the problem of hidden data from clinical trials, citing this and 
multiple other examples of potential distortions and misleading reports.[26] 
OQHRIWKHNH\DVSHFWVRIWKHWUHDWPHQWRIFDQFHUIURPWKHSDWLHQWV¶SHUVSHFWLYHDQG
an essential aspect of the evaluation of cost effectiveness, is an assessment of quality-
of-life outcomes.  A review of RCT protocols and publications of 173 cancer 
trials[27] showed that only 52% included quality-of-life outcomes in the protocol and, 
of these, only 39% reported the quality-of-life outcomes, 20% limited reports to other 
outcomes, and the results of 41% remained unreported.  Submissions of evidence for 
the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) appraisals show that 
companies sometimes fail to divulge the results of such measures, even when they are 
known to exist, preferring to use other methods that may produce more favourable 
estimates of cost effectiveness. 1 
Injustices in the interpretation of evidence 
Evidence is frequently incomplete or conflicting, so that it is necessary to use some 
degree of interpretation, extrapolation or make assumptions to fill any gaps.  If this is 
done in such a way that certain groups or individuals are disadvantaged, then this is 
another area in which injustices may arise.   
$WWKLVSRLQWLWVHHPVUHOHYDQWWRUHWXUQWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHUROHRIWKHµH[SHUW¶LQ
the decision-making process.  In discussing the relationship between healthcare 
professional and patient, Carel and Kidd discuss the appropriateness of assigning 
HSLVWHPLFSULYLOHJHWRDQH[SHUW³«ZHFODLPWKDWLWLVXVHIXOWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQ 
warranted and unwarranted epistemic privilege, e.g. healthcare professionals 
warrant epistemic privilege in their interpretation of a CT scan, but not in deciding 
where a patient should die (e.g. in hospital or at home).´[7] 
In current decision-making processes, there are many areas of potentially relevant 
expertise; various clinical disciplines, pharmacology, medical science, health 
economics, utility analysis, decision analysis, medical ethics, statistics and public 
 
1 For example, in an appraisal of Golimumab (TA255), SF-36 data collected in the trials were excluded 
IURPWKHPDQXIDFWXUHU¶VVXEPLVVLRQDQGUHTXHVWHGWZLFHEHIRUHEHLQJVXEPLWWHGVHH
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta225/history).  
 
health.  Specific aspects of evidence may warrant epistemic privilege for a particular 
group of experts, but it may be difficult to identify those areas of a complex technical 
argument where such privilege is unwarranted.  An expert may be operating within a 
particular paradigm that presupposes some underlying set of values or assumptions, 
which are not directly within their area of expertise.  Alternatively, the presentation of 
a rational and highly technical scientific argument may obscure the nature of some of 
the underlying value judgements. 
This may be further clarified by a couple of examples from the processes used by 
NICE in making decisions on behalf of the NHS in England and Wales, which are 
likely to be representative of the type of decisions made in many other jurisdictions.  
The first example relates to the way in which NICE estimates utility for the cost-
utility calculations that form the basis of many judgements. 
Although NICE states in its documentation that it does not subscribe to a purely 
utilitarian approach to distributive justice[28], many of the decision-making processes 
that it applies are centred around a calculation of cost effectiveness and, although 
there are a number of flexibilities in the process, there is often a statement to the 
effect that the commiWWHHGHWHUPLQHGDµPRVWSODXVLEOHLQFUHPHQWDOFRVWHIIHFWLYHQHVV
UDWLR,&(5¶7KH,&(5LVDPHDVXUHRIFRVWHIIHFWLYHQHVVXVXDOO\SUHVHQWHGDVD
cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY), calculated in line with their guidance on 
methodology.[29]   
The calculation of the cost per QALY is based upon a process of health economic 
modelling that involves a complex technical exercise, drawing together evidence from 
a variety of sources, the development of a computer model and choosing between a 
series of alternative assumptions and calculations.  The ICER is only one of a variety 
of different parameters that may be relevant to decision-making, the QALY is only 
one of a number of measures of effectiveness and NICE methodology uses a specific 
way of calculating the QALY, each stage requiring a series of assumptions and value 
judgements. 
The outcome measure which NICE advises for calculating the QALY is the EuroQol 
± DPHDVXUHEDVHGXSRQILYHµGLPHQVLRQV¶RIKHDOWKHDFKRIZKLFKDUHVFRUHGDWthree 
levels2 and then converted to a utility weighting based upon a tariff that is specific to 
England (EQ-5D).[30]  The relative value of these dimensions varies between 
individuals and has also been shown to vary systematically between different racial 
and ethnic groups.[31]   Furthermore, there are many aspects of healthcare that may 
be important to individuals or groups that are not captured at all in such measures.  
For example, studies have demonstrated that the EQ-5D is insensitive to levels of 
hearing loss[32] and may not adequately capture the outcome of interventions that 
affect mental health,[33] dementia[34] or multiple sclerosis.[35]  Such measures also 
fail to include other widely valued aspects of healthcare such as processes of care,[36] 
compassion, dignity and autonomy.  It seems inevitable that rationing decisions based 
upon evidence that fails to quantify areas such as mental health, disability or 
compassionate care will result in displacement of healthcare that provides benefits in 
these domains. 
The result of NICE methodology is that experts, such as health economists and 
systematic reviewers, often acting on behalf of commercial sponsors, produce 
extensive and highly technical documentation, often running to many hundreds of 
pages.  These generate numerical estimates of a parameter, the ICER, which drives 
decision-making.  However, although these experts may warrant epistemic privilege 
in interpreting the research evidence and in the process of calculation, there may be 
 
2 A more recent version of the EQ-5D with five levels has not currently been adopted by NICE. 
unwarranted epistemic privilege deeply embedded and obscured within this 
apparently objective process, particularly relating to the weights and values assigned 
to the various aspects of risks and benefits.  
A further example is that of discounting costs and benefits in health economic (and 
other public policy) evaluations.[37]  This is common practice and there are a number 
of different opinions and justifications for using particular rates that relate to 
economic growth, budgetary constraints and time preferences for expenditure and 
outcomes.[38]  This has recently been the subject of considerable debate amongst 
experts in the field of economics and health economics, often providing highly 
technical arguments for using particular rates[39] or for and against the use of 
differential rates for costs and benefits.[38]   
However, it is worth considering the overall effects of these differences on the 
outcome of the decision-making process.  Tied up in this debate is a value judgement 
about our preferences, either as a society or as individuals, for immediate versus 
future gains and losses.  A higher discount rate results in future costs and benefits 
becoming less important in any decision-making process.   For example, higher 
discount rates will make screening and preventative medicine less attractive, due to 
the up-front costs and deferred benefits, or in a non-health example, would reduce the 
value of measures to address climate change that would benefit future 
generations.[40]  There is a danger that to defer to technical experts to advise on 
appropriate discount rates is to lose sight of the underlying value judgements that may 
not be a proper subject for such epistemic privilege.  This is a particular concern if 
there is a risk of bias in the process for developing methodology, since industries with 
the resources to influence such decisions have a vested interest in minimising 
discount rates to maximise the price that can be justified for technologies with 
deferred and uncertain benefits.  
These examples highlight the potential risks of increasing specialisation that relies 
upon specialist expertise to generate or process evidence.  This may require them to 
consciously or unwittingly provide judgements that may be outside their area of 
expertise and may disadvantage those who are subject to the decision, whose evidence 
is never sought or represented.  
Vandana Shiva used the term µHSLVWHPRORJLFDOYLROHQFH¶ to describe the potential 
injustices that may be introduced between the scientific expert and non-expert;  
³+HUHYLROHQFHLVLQIOLcted on the subject socially through the sharp divide 
between the expert and the non-expert - a divide which converts the vast 
majority of non-experts into non-knowers even in those areas of life in 
which the responsibility of practice and action rests with them. 
But even the expert is not spared: fragmentation of knowledge converts the 
expert into a non-knower in fields of knowledge other than his or her 
VSHFLDOL]DWLRQ´[41] 
,QWKLVUHVSHFWLWLVQRWMXVWWKHSDWLHQWVZKRDUHWKHµQRQ-NQRZHUV¶EXWWKRVH
healthcare professionals who, as consumers of the guidance, do not have the resources 
to re-examine or challenge any underlying data or assumptions. 
Who is wronged by evidence-based guidance? 
If the evidence underpinning rationing decisions is flawed this may undermine efforts 
to ensure distributive justice.  Injustices may occur either through denying access to 
technologies, which would have been available had unbiased evidence been available 
or, conversely, through approval of technologies that would have been rejected.  In 
the former circumstances, the wronged parties are easily identified as those who may 
have benefited from incorrectly rejected technologies, but I would suggest that this is 
a less common situation.  Since most evidence is generated, analysed, reported, and 
often interpreted, by an industry with commercial interest in the new technology, the 
direction of any bias is likely to exaggerate the benefits and underestimate the costs 
and risks of such treatments.  Furthermore, such overt rationing decisions are 
transparent and open to challenge, the individuals who are wronged are identifiable, 
and those with a commercial interest in a positive recommendation have the financial, 
scientific and legal resources to challenge a negative decision. 
It seems more likely that any evidential failings will result in inappropriately liberal 
guidance, in which case the wronged parties are less easily identifiable.  In this 
situation the injustice relates to opportunity costs and occurs through the diversion of 
limited resources away from aspects of healthcare which, given unbiased evidence, 
would have been seen to better serve the aim of distributive justice.  Since the 
wronged parties are not easily identifiable or linked to the specific guidance, the aims 
of transparency and openness to challenge cannot be achieved, exacerbating potential 
injustices.   
Some general points can be made about the areas and groups that are likely to be 
wronged.  Disinvestment decisions rarely relate to specific technologies or are 
evaluated with the same rigour as those regarding new and costly technologies.[42] 
Attempts to identify an appropriate threshold[43] and studies of the effects of 
financial pressures[44] suggest that displacement of resources is likely to occur in 
particular areas, potentially increasing waiting times, diluting care and limiting access 
for patients with chronic conditions, such as mental health, chronic physical 
conditions and disability.   
Such wrongs are not necessarily limited to rationing decisions, but may be occur with 
any evidence-based guidance.  Although other guidance is rarely mandatory, there 
may be performance indicators or incentives for healthcare professionals to adhere to 
such guidance, and the underlying biases and value judgements may not be 
transparent to individual professionals or patients relying upon the guidance.  For 
example, where trials have unjustifiably excluded elderly people or other specific 
groups, decision makers face a choice between advising against providing a 
potentially beneficial treatment or recommending its use, based upon the research 
from which these groups were deliberately excluded.   
Addressing potential evidential injustices 
Decisions regarding the allocation of limited healthcare resources will always be 
complex, requiring trade-offs between competing priorities and recognition of 
practical limitations.  However, regardless of the methods used to achieve distributive 
justice, the legitimacy of such procedures relies upon a foundation of unbiased 
evidence.  There are a number of practical steps that might be taken to improve the 
current situation.  
Shifting the research agenda 
Since most research is undertaken by those with vested interests in marketing costly 
new technologies, evidence focusses on these areas and risks displacing healthcare 
activities that are not subject to such research, despite being highly valued by society.  
For example, I would suggest that society puts a high value on dignified and 
compassionate care for those with terminal cancer, dementia, mental health or other 
chronic health problems.  However, such caring processes are of less commercial 
interest, dignity and compassion are rarely evaluated and do not form a part of the 
calculation of healthcare benefit, resulting in these areas being potential targets for 
disinvestment.  Addressing this would require incentives and public research funding 
WREHGLUHFWHGDWWKHVHµ&LQGHUHOOD¶VXEMHFWVDQGWRLQFOXGHVWXGLHVWRLGHQWLI\PHWKRGV
to quantify such benefits and incorporate them into the value frameworks used in 
decision making. 
Regulating trial design 
Whilst some regulatory authorities, such as the Food and Drug Administration and the 
European Medicines Agency, currently have input into the design of trials for 
regulatory approval, they are primarily concerned with safety and efficacy.  However, 
estimates of comparative effectiveness or cost effectiveness may require different 
outcomes, comparators or data collection.  Extension of the powers of regulatory 
bodies or input from those responsible for rationing decisions may be appropriate, to 
ensure that studies collect data that makes them fit-for-purpose in informing such 
deliberations. 
Transparent reporting of results 
It seems inconsistent that we go to great lengths to ensure that all research on human 
subjects goes through strict ethical evaluation and yet fail to enforce the aspects of the 
Helsinki Declaration that deal with the reporting of the outcomes of such trials[45].  
Human subjects consenting to participate in clinical trials do so on the assumption 
that the gains in knowledge from the research will benefit society as a whole.  To 
allow the results to be distorted, withheld or mis-interpreted for commercial reasons is 
to undermine the ethical basis of that research.   
Independent evaluation 
Improved legitimacy for the identification, review and synthesis of evidence might be 
DFKLHYHGE\HQVXULQJWKLVLVFDUULHGRXWDWDUP¶VOHQJWKE\LQGHSHQGHQWDFDGHPLF
bodies, without a vested interest in the technology.  In the original process developed 
by NICE for evaluating new technologies (now known as Multiple Technology 
Appraisal, MTA) independent academic groups were commissioned to review the 
evidence, with safeguards to avoid potential conflicts of interest.  However, a new 
Single Technology Appraisal process (STA) process was introduced in 2005 in which 
the sponsor of the technology is responsible for the identification and evaluation of 
evidence.  This is now the process used for the majority of technology appraisals, 
despite the clear conflicts of interest and a review of the process, commissioned by 
NICE, which expressed concerns about the lack of balance in the process[46]. 
Conditional approval and continued data collection 
Even with tighter controls on research methods, greater transparency and independent 
review, it is known that early trials of new technologies tend to overestimate benefits 
and under-estimate risks compared to real-world use,[47] and the validity of 
extrapolation of short-term and surrogate outcomes cannot be beyond doubt for a 
novel technology.[48]  This suggests that there is a place for far greater use of post-
approval monitoring of outcomes, conditional approval that is subject to review, and 
outcome-based payment schemes.[49] 
Representation for those subject to epistemic exclusion 
One of the key areas for potential injustice relates to epistemic exclusion.  This occurs 
not only when a person is wronged by exclusion from participating in the process of 
generating knowledge[50] but also from situations ³«where social meanings are 
PDGHDQGOHJLWLPDWHG´.[7]  In the context of evidence-based healthcare this includes 
the lack of opportunity to contribute to the value judgements inherent in the 
interpretation of evidence.  As we have seen, the lack of explicit consideration of the 
opportunity costs of displaced healthcare means that those who are excluded are 
likely to be unaware that they will be adversely affected by a decision and are, thus, 
also excluded from the opportunity to challenge such decisions.  Addressing this 
imbalance would require a mechanism to specifically seek input from, and represent 
the interests of those who are likely to be disadvantaged.  Such measures might 
include specific studies to seek the views and preferences of such groups, more 
transparent and rigorous examination of disinvestment decisions, and an independent 
process to represent the interests of unidentified groups whose services may be 
displaced. 
Moving the goalposts 
The potential shortcomings, distortions and injustices that are inherent in evidence-
based processes may be partially addressed by some of the measures discussed above.  
However, change is likely to be slow and incomplete and outside the control of those 
who must make decisions, so interpretation of the available evidence will remain a 
vital aspect of decision-making.  As highlighted by Bales,[51] it is important to 
GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQµrightness criteria¶WKDWUHIOHFWWKHHWKLFDOSULQFLSOHVWKDWXQGHUSLQ
the desired outcome of any guidance or policy decisions, and the decision methods 
themselves.  It may be that a just outcome that reflects the desired distributional 
principles is most likely to be achieved by a process that does not directly implement 
these principles.  A sailor who sets a course based upon examination of the evidence 
from a map, is likely to miss their intended destination if they do not allow for the 
crosswinds, tides and currents that may alter their course.  To take evidence at face 
value, without considering the inherent biases and injustices, may lead to decisions 
that fail to hit the mark.  To inform decisions, evidence needs to be sought, not only 
related to the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of the technology under 
consideration, but also on the systematic biases and injustices that may be relevant to 
its interpretation. 
Conclusions 
Biases in research evidence are well recognised but rarely addressed specifically in 
developing guidance, leaving certain groups subject to epistemic injustices and 
exclusion.  Whether applying procedural and/or substantive principles of justice, a 
process that is based upon biased or flawed evidence, has questionable legitimacy.  
Existing processes for the generation and interpretation of evidence are likely to 
favour the commercial and political interests of those who fund and commission 
research.  Addressing such injustices would require a rebalancing of power through 
shifting the research agenda, regulation of research, independent evaluation of 
evidence, transparency of research outcomes, and a means to represent the interests of 
those marginalised or excluded groups with a legitimate interest in the process.  
Failing to generate evidence that adequately captures important benefits relating to 
particular disease areas or treatment modalities makes it likely that some patients will 
have the care they require unjustly displaced by new technologies.  There is a danger 
that evidence-based healthcare results in value being assigned to those aspects of 
healthcare that are measured, rather than measuring and thus promoting, those aspects 
that society values. 
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